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INTRODUCTION 
Two Articles in this issue, one by Professor Rock1 and the other by Pro-
fessors Adler and Kahan,2 draw renewed attention to the contracting 
challenges raised by debt financing. The occasion for revisiting the agency 
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1 Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 
(2013).  
2 Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1773 (2013).  
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costs of debt, according to Professor Rock, is the successful alignment of the 
interests of shareholders and corporate managers over the past thirty years.3 
This alignment has been achieved by a combination of contract, market, and 
legal measures (such as changes in compensation structure, shareholder 
concentration and activism, and board ideology).4 As a result of these 
developments, Professor Rock observes that “managers and directors today 
largely ‘think like shareholders.’”5 
All investors, including creditors, benefit from the correction of inefficient 
incentives that lead managers to entrench themselves, build conglomerate 
empires, and shirk or consume perquisites. Other stakeholders such as 
employees, suppliers, and customers also benefit from such correction. 
However, the convergence of managerial and equity interests threatens to 
increase the agency costs of debt because debtholder and shareholder 
interests diverge in other respects. Most notably, as faithful agents of their 
shareholders, managers are more likely to (a) forego lower-risk, profitable 
projects (“underinvestment”); (b) invest in higher-risk, unprofitable alterna-
tives (“overinvestment” or “risk alteration”); (c) incur additional debt to 
further leverage the equity in the firm; and (d) distribute firm value to 
shareholders in the form of dividends or share repurchases.  
Professor Rock suggests that the negative externality of shareholder-
centrism has been aggravated by the significant and contemporaneous 
increase in corporate leveraging.6 The proposition that leveraging increased 
while the agency problems of debt became more severe is puzzling. To act in 
their shareholders’ best interests, however, managers should borrow up to 
the point at which the marginal cost of further debt financing equals that of 
equity financing. The benefits of debt financing include the discipline 
imposed on managers by regular mandatory payments of free cash flow and 
the tax deduction from interest payments, while the costs stem from the 
resulting increase in the likelihood of bankruptcy and the agency costs of 
debt. The debt investors bear these costs and, to the extent they are in-
formed, will compel the shareholders to internalize those costs. If the 
agency costs of debt truly have risen during the past three decades, what 
then explains the contemporaneous increase in corporate leveraging over 
that period?  
While it is possible that the bankruptcy costs of debt have decreased or 
that the tax benefits have increased over this period, another possibility 
 
3 Rock, supra note 1, at 1912-13. 
4 Id. at 1910. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 1919. 
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more germane to this Response is that the quality of debtholder contracts 
has improved as borrowing has increased. To the extent that debt investors 
price agency costs, a firm can lower its cost of capital by reducing the 
inefficiencies of debtor–creditor conflict. Empirical studies show that 
contractual covenants are indeed priced by debt investors, giving borrowers 
incentives to agree to them.7 
The mechanisms of debtholder governance have been subject to substan-
tial examination in both law and finance scholarship. The literature reveals 
that covenants play important roles in mitigating the agency costs of debt 
and adverse selection.8 Professor Rock’s and Professors Adler and Kahan’s 
Articles in this issue contribute to this body of literature by focusing on the 
limitations of the existing technology of contractual protections and propos-
ing reforms of the governing legal rules to address these limitations.9  
Although debt contracts offer significant protection to debtholders, the 
extent to which debt contracts mitigate agency problems might be limited 
by three features raised by Professors Rock and Professors Adler and 
Kahan. First, specifying and enforcing optimal protective covenants is 
costly, and the costs of some conceivable protections exceed the benefits. 
Second, contract law limits the parties’ ability to provide for effective 
remedies for breaches of those covenants, particularly against third parties 
who either have control of, or benefit from, those breaches. Third, the 
parties may sometimes omit even covenants whose benefits outweigh their 
costs because of imbalances in market conditions or bargaining power; one 
example might be the period of covenant-lite bonds preceding the financial 
crisis of 2007. Professor Rock and Professors Adler and Kahan propose 
legal reforms to address these limitations, including (a) extending mandato-
ry, legally imposed standards such as fiduciary duties and the duty of good 
faith; and (b) expanding contract remedies to allow enforcement of contract 
 
7 See Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt 
Covenants 30 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
id=466240 (finding a negative correlation between the inclusion of a covenant and the resulting 
loan yield). On the equity side, Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Charles Wang provide 
evidence suggesting that equity markets have learned to internalize the significant factors of 
quality governance. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Learning and the 
Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 238-45 (2013). 
8 See, e.g., Matthew T. Billett et al., Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, 
and Covenants, 62 J. FIN. 697, 699 (2007) (finding that covenants mitigate the agency costs of debt for 
high-growth firms); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An 
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979) (describing how covenants lower the various 
types of agency costs of debt). 
9 The Articles discuss, in particular, the gaps left behind by (a) the current legislative and 
common law rules governing fraudulent transfer laws, and (b) the preferences and restrictions on 
corporate dividends and share repurchases. Adler & Kahan, supra note 2; Rock, supra note 1. 
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covenants against third parties. As discussed below, the available technolo-
gy for debt contracting is more potent than it may appear and the incre-
mental gains from the authors’ proposals are probably not worth the costs. 
Part I explains that the typical remedy contracted for by lenders is the right 
to terminate and assume greater control of the debtor’s decisionmaking. 
This is a distinctive and effective remedy that contrasts with the usual 
contract remedy of expectation damages; indeed, debt contracts do not 
provide for such damages. Part II suggests that the existing combination of 
debt covenants and security interests can achieve much of what Professors 
Adler and Kahan are seeking without the social cost of imposing greater 
information burdens on creditors. For example, the ability of managers of a 
firm to engage in either massive borrowing or a leveraged buyout will be 
constrained if the firm has given most of its assets as collateral for a prior 
loan. Part III begins to tackle the more puzzling phenomenon raised by the 
authors’ examples: debt contracts sometimes do not incorporate the 
available technology and are both unsecured and light on covenants. 
Although the omissions might be the result of market failure, they may 
alternatively be efficient responses to changing market conditions. 
I. INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND MANDATORY  
LEGAL STANDARDS 
The academic discipline of contract theory is founded on the observa-
tion that many contracts are incomplete because transaction costs prevent 
parties from providing for the efficient set of obligations in each possible 
future state of the world. Consequently, parties are relegated to choosing 
second-best tools of contract design. To illustrate in the context of a debt 
contract, suppose that Project A is the value-maximizing alternative in state 
i, while Project B is the value-maximizing alternative in state j. The optimal 
complete contingent contract would oblige the firm to invest in the efficient 
project in each respective state of the world. However, providing in this 
respect for each possible future state of the world is costly—both at the 
front end of contract design and at the back end of enforcement. At the 
front end, parties must contemplate and define each relevant state of the 
world, and they must agree to and specify the contingently optimal invest-
ment for each state. At the back end, they must monitor and observe the 
debtor’s actions and, if necessary, verify performance or breach during the 
enforcement proceedings in court. The front- and back-end cost of providing 
for different obligations in states i and j may outweigh the incremental 
gains. Therefore, it may be more efficient to lump the two states together, 
by requiring, for example, Project A (or prohibiting project B) in both 
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states. In a debt contract, the parties might prohibit sales of assets in bulk, 
mergers, or future borrowing, rather than incur the contracting costs of 
specifying the conditions under which such sales, mergers, or borrowing are 
permitted. In practice, then, most covenants are either under- or overinclu-
sive in proscribing undesirable behavior, and this incompleteness leaves 
behind residual agency costs. 
Contract design is fundamentally an exercise in minimizing these residual 
costs. The technology of contract design is quite rich, allowing parties 
significant flexibility to tailor their contracts to their circumstances.10 Two 
important mechanisms in the toolkit for reducing agency costs are (1) the 
use of standards (as opposed to rules) and (2) contingent control rights and 
renegotiation. 
The first mechanism, the use of standards, invites the court to determine 
ex post whether the firm’s decisions met the expectations of the parties—for 
example, whether the decision was reasonable given the realized state of the 
world. Performance standards, such as obligations of good faith, best efforts, 
and due diligence, convey this discretion to the court. These standards can 
be effective tools if the reason for contract incompleteness is the cost of 
specifying the optimal project in each state of the world. While perfor-
mance standards save front-end negotiating and drafting costs, they also 
raise back-end enforcement costs, especially the costs of litigation and 
judicial error in applying the standard. In some cases, this trade is advant-
ageous, especially if the probability of going to court is low. However, if the 
obstacle to contract completeness is the high cost of litigation and judicial 
error in verifying the existing state or the efficient project in that state, then 
the case for a standard is more controversial and complicated.11 Indeed, a 
key reason that many commentators oppose the broadening of fiduciary 
duties or weakening of the business judgment or good faith defense is that 
 
10 The parties have further flexibility to tailor their governance provisions to asset- or  
business-types within the borrower’s enterprise by splitting assets between affiliated legal entities. 
For example, a conglomerate with a manufacturing and a hotel division might choose instead to 
put each division in a separate subsidiary in order to tailor the financing and governance structure 
to each line of business. This is an important motivation for the parent–subsidiary structure in 
corporate groups. See Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries 
of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 560-65 (2007) (explaining the complex tradeoff between economic 
integration and capital-structure tailoring considerations in the decision to either integrate assets 
within a single firm or establish parent–subsidiary relationships between distinct legal firms). 
11 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 526 (2008) (showing that contracts can be designed to leave the costly 
verification of standards off the equilibrium path so that verification costs are not incurred); 
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate 
Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 881-96 (2010) (describing the efficiency of contract vagueness). 
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such reforms would exacerbate the cost of judicial error and litigation.12 
Moreover, if the ex post determination of the court cannot be readily 
predicted by the firm’s directors, the beneficial effect on managerial incen-
tives is limited. Facing the risk of a surprise adverse judgment, potential 
directors may be reluctant to serve without indemnification or expensive 
professional counsel, and will exercise excessive caution in managing the 
firm (just as the expansion of medical malpractice liability may lead to 
defensive medicine).13 
Despite the cost of the standards describe above, Professor Rock proposes 
that directors be subject to broader standards by regulation.14 He suggests, 
for example, that the fiduciary duties of directors be recast to oblige them to 
maximize the value of the firm as a whole.15 Lenders themselves could 
include contractual standards that mimic elements of fiduciary duties, 
requiring the firm to use reasonable efforts to maximize value and to retain 
only directors who assume this obligation. In practice, however, debt 
contracts typically do not use such broad obligation standards to correct the 
incentives of directors, even though the front-end cost of doing so is low.16 
This practice raises some doubt as to whether additional mandatory perfor-
mance standards, such as broader fiduciary duties, would yield a contracting 
benefit net of their costs.17 Moreover, I describe below the distinctive 
features of debt contracting (contingent control transfers and security 
 
12 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 117-24 (2004) (arguing that judges’ lack of business expertise would lead to 
judicial error if the business judgment rule were relaxed).  
13 See Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1787 (“Delaware judges and lawmakers . . . realize that 
the prospect of personal liability—whether to shareholders or creditors—would make directors 
excessively cautious . . . .”). 
14 Rock, supra note 1, at 1977-86.  
15 See id. at 1955 (“[D]irectors’ understanding of their role should return from the contempo-
rary exhortation to maximize equity value to the traditional goal of maximizing firm value.”). A 
related important question is whether this reform would change the deference that courts give to 
directors under the business judgment rule. In a similar vein, the sanction imposed on directors of 
corporations for improper share repurchases or dividends—where corporations are insolvent in 
either the balance sheet or equity sense—would be limited by the full defense available for 
directors who rely in good faith and reasonably on corporate records, officers, employees, or 
experts. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 172 (2011). 
16 See Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1787 (“[L]oan agreements give no indication that com-
panies and creditors would want to impose liability on directors.”). Contract scholars have 
speculated that novel contract terms may be discouraged by the risk of adverse judicial interpreta-
tion and by resistance from capital markets. E.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, 
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 774 (1995). 
17 Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott raise a similar doubt as to the value of state-imposed 
standards in commercial law. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594 (2003). 
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interests) that are sufficiently potent such that, for most debtors, mandatory 
standards are likely to undermine rather than help debt financing. 
The second mechanism, contingent control rights, transfers control over 
corporate assets from shareholders to debtholders upon covenant violation.18 
In this respect, the operation of debt covenants differs fundamentally from 
the conventional use of contract promises, particularly in one-shot transac-
tions. If a seller, for example, promises to deliver a good in exchange for 
payment, the seller is liable for damages if she fails to deliver. The buyer 
generally cannot assume control of the seller’s premises and manufacture or 
seize the good itself. The prospect of liability deters the seller from breaching, 
and if breach occurs, she must compensate the buyer for the loss of her 
expectancy interest. The breach of a debt covenant, by contrast, does not 
give rise to liability for expectation damages, but instead triggers a shift in 
control. For example, if the debtor fails to make a scheduled payment and 
the lender exercises its right to call the loan when market interest rates are 
lower than the contract rate, the lender is not entitled to collect the differ-
ence between the contract rate and the lending rate at the time of breach. 
Rather, the lender has the right to accelerate the maturity of the indebted-
ness and demand prompt payment of the principal and accrued interest.  
The acceleration of maturity and calling of a loan give the lender the 
right to repayment—or to the seizure of assets to enforce repayment—but 
more often, the threat of acceleration leads to a shift in decisionmaking 
control to the lender and to renegotiation.19 For example, in addition to a 
higher interest rate, the lender may ask for shorter maturity in a renegotiated 
agreement as well as management changes. Thus, in addition to deterring 
opportunism, debt covenants provide the triggers that enable the lender to 
intervene in governance.20 Institutional lenders routinely set covenants 
tightly from the time of contracting, so that they are frequently tripped and 
 
18 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Con-
tracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 486-90 (1992); Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory 
of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1027, 
1049-50 (1994). 
19 See, e.g., Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical 
Investigation, 64 J. FIN. 1657, 1660 (2009) (finding in their sample that only four percent of 
covenant violations led to a termination of the relationship within two quarters after the violation, 
but the breaching borrowers were subject to disciplinary actions by their creditors). 
20 See George G. Triantis, Debt Financing, Corporate Decision Making, and Security Design, 26 
CAN. BUS. L.J. 93, 94 (1996) (“Debt covenants therefore constrain the firm’s decision space and, if 
they are violated, may trigger the more active intervention of the lender in the firm’s decisions.”); 
George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1093-94 (1995) (discussing the role debt covenants play in triggering 
investor activism).  
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renegotiated, even in the absence of impending financial distress.21 Tight 
covenants protect lenders by ensuring greater bargaining power in renegoti-
ation.22 Provisions in debt contracts and debtor–creditor law—such as 
avoidable preferences, equitable subordination, and lender liability—
provide incentives for the lenders to monitor compliance and act upon 
information of a violation without abusing their control or power.23 
 These control-shifting provisions in debt contracts are critical tools of 
corporate governance, but they effectively replace one imperfect agency 
relationship with another, less imperfect, one. The provisions address the 
worsening problem of shareholder governance during a firm’s decline 
through the less severe problem of debt governance. There is substantial 
evidence that lender intervention following a covenant violation yields 
positive externalities.24 Even when a lender exits rather than intervenes, the 
 
21 See Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant 
Hypothesis, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1091, 1093 (finding that covenant violations occur frequently and 
often in the absence of financial distress); Nicolae Gârleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and 
Renegotiation of Debt Covenants, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 749, 749 (2009) (asserting that tight covenants 
protect lenders from information asymmetry that favors the borrower); Michael R. Roberts, The 
Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting 1 (Dec. 29, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/id=1732364 (finding that the typical 
loan in the sample is renegotiated four times). However, Roberts’s other interesting finding is that 
renegotiation in his sample is “initiated by borrowers primarily in response to changing condi-
tions, as opposed to lender interventions due to default”. Id. 
22 Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private 
Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159, 166 (2009) (noting that tight covenants allocate bargaining 
power between the borrower and the lender in future renegotiations). 
23 See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 20, at 1094-95 (noting that one of the effects of avoida-
ble preference provisions in bankruptcy law is to incentivize lenders to intervene upon early signs 
of distress instead of waiting for insolvency, at which point additional firm value will have been 
lost); see also Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor, 
50 J. FIN. 1113, 1114 (1995) (finding that long-term debt with covenants increases the bank’s 
incentive to monitor by decreasing the bank’s payoff it if does not monitor); Joshua D. Rauh & 
Amir Sufi, Capital Structure and Debt Structure, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4242, 4243-44 (2010) 
(concluding that low credit-quality firms are more likely than higher credit-quality firms to spread 
their debt issues across multiple tiers that include secured bank debt with tight covenants and 
subordinated debt with loose covenants). 
24 For example, Professors Greg Nini, David Smith, and Amir Sufi show that covenant viola-
tions are followed immediately by an increase in CEO turnover, an increase in the hiring of 
turnaround specialists, a decline in acquisitions and expenditures, and a sharp reduction in 
leverage and shareholder payouts. See Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment 
Policy, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 400, 401 (2009) (“Capital expenditure restrictions are 20% more likely to 
be observed in a renegotiated agreement following a covenant violation.”). They also show that 
firm operation and stock price performance improve following a violation. Id. at 415-16; see also 
Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt 
Covenants, 63 J. FIN. 2085, 2106 (2008) (“[C]apital expenditures decline significantly in response to 
covenant violations. We observe a quarterly decline in investment of approximately 1% of capital, a 
13% decline relative to the level of investment outside of violation states.”); Greg Nini et al., 
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lender’s exit is valuable because it communicates information to another 
stakeholder who then takes corrective action.25 Actions such as extinguishing 
the liability by payment or granting new collateral might be observed by 
other creditors, shareholders, or employees, who may themselves intervene 
to address the underlying problem with the firm. Recent work provides 
empirical support for the value of this type of interactive corporate govern-
ance.26  
As in the case of shareholder control, however, lender control produces 
negative externalities in addition to the positive ones described above. For 
example, creditors prefer risk-averse decisions and are more likely to urge 
management to liquidate assets and abandon growth options. There is also 
conflict between the enforcing lender and other creditors who are vying to 
improve their payoffs in the event the firm becomes insolvent. A number of 
legal doctrines in corporate and bankruptcy law police the more blatant 
actions that redistribute value to the enforcing creditor from the passive 
ones.27 
In sum, the case for the regulatory imposition of significant performance 
standards, such as a fiduciary duty to maximize firm value, is complicated. 
The existing technology of debt contract design—particularly debt covenants—
provides a sophisticated set of tools, of which contract standards and 
contingent control and renegotiation rights are but two. Professor Rock’s 
proposal to broaden mandatory standards by regulation faces the objection 
that debtholders can already provide for these standards contractually, but 
do not. Instead, debtholders rely significantly on contingent control rights 
that are conditioned on covenant violations. These provisions are priced in 
the market and create value by addressing agency problems. Under Profes-
sor Rock’s regulatory proposal, however, the parties may not be able to avoid 
 
Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713, 1748, 1752 
(2012) (providing data showing an increase in operating performance and stock price performance 
following covenant violations). 
25 See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 20, at 1108-12 (“[T]he sale of stock by a shareholder, the 
termination of deliveries by a supplier or of orders by a customer, and the acceleration of debt 
obligations by a lender often send useful signals to other stakeholders through a variety of 
channels.”). 
26 See Liangliang Jiang & Hui Zhou, Do Auditors Play a Positive Role in the Resolution of 
Debt Covenant Violations? 13-14 (Oct. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/id=2166174 (finding that covenant violations lead to closer monitoring by external 
auditors). 
27 See, e.g., Triantis & Daniels, supra note 20, at 1094 (discussing the voidable preference rule 
under bankruptcy law, which “encourages timely monitoring and pre-insolvency action by 
threatening to reverse any attempt [by an enforcing creditor] to exit after the debtor has become 
insolvent”). 
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costly judicial determinations of whether directors made value-maximizing 
decisions or whether a distribution to shareholders was made in good faith.  
I now turn to the Article by Professors Adler and Kahan, who are una-
bashedly contractarian; they reject mandatory provisions and instead seek 
legal reform to broaden the parties’ toolkit. Indeed, they advocate turning 
existing mandatory regulation—such as laws against fraudulent transfers, 
preferences, stock repurchases, and dividend payments by undercapitalized 
firms—into defaults and allowing debtors to customize their own provi-
sions. They envisage debtors using this freedom of contract also to either 
increase or decrease the liability on third parties who participate in the 
violation of covenants. It is hard to argue, of course, against the contractual 
freedom to customize in settings with sophisticated and informed parties 
unless it inflicts external costs not borne by the parties to the contract. 
However, Professors Adler and Kahan’s proposal may well produce such 
externalities because future creditors, for example, do not have an easy way 
of assuring themselves that their prospective debtor has not agreed to broad 
and severe third-party sanctions. The information costs imposed on all third 
parties dealing with the debtor may not be worth the incremental benefit. 
Although the existing legislative restrictions may seem to take the form of 
one-size-fits-all, significant customization is available through the technolo-
gy of security interests, which the authors undervalue. 
II. CONTRACT REMEDIES, THIRD PARTIES, AND  
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The foregoing discussion of the role of covenants in transferring control 
illustrates that contract remedies are critical features of contract design and 
are not limited to deterring breach or compensating a promisee for its loss 
from breach.28 A similar approach can be found in other types of commercial 
contracts, such as franchise agreements, in which franchisees promise to 
refrain from actions that might harm the value of the franchise trademark.29 
The most important remedy for breach of this promise is that the franchisor 
may then terminate the franchise. The cost of litigation, the risk of judicial 
 
28 George Triantis, The Evolution of Contract Remedies (And Why Do Contracts Professors Teach 
Remedies First?), 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 643, 653 (2010) (asserting that contractual remedies are 
expected to achieve efficiency across a broad range of incentive and risk-bearing objectives, of 
which efficient breach is of relatively little consequence); George Triantis, Promissory Autonomy, 
Imperfect Courts, and the Immorality of the Expectation Damages Default, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 827, 
833 (2012) (describing the significance of contingent remedies, including termination). 
29 See, e.g., Sample Business Contracts: Form of Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation Franchise 
Agreement, ONECLE, http://contracts.onecle.com/krispy-kreme/franchise.shtml (last visited May 6, 
2013). 
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error, and the franchisee’s insolvency make the franchisor’s right to sue for 
damages of secondary importance. Given the franchisee’s specific invest-
ment in the business, the loss of the franchise alone is a sufficient deterrent 
against breach. 
Although armed with their respective contingent control rights, the 
franchisor and lender nevertheless share two concerns. First, the deterrence 
created by these provisions dissipates as the value of the borrower or 
franchisee falls and the entity approaches insolvency. Contract design 
presents a solution to this problem of gradual decline: trip wires that 
transfer control on signs of financial distress. Financial ratio covenants, in 
particular, play key roles in this regard, allowing the lender to intervene or 
exit at earlier warning signs of distress. These provisions depend on costly 
monitoring of the borrower or franchisee, but this cost can be reduced by 
coordinated monitoring among creditors and other stakeholders, which I 
have discussed at some length elsewhere.30 The second, more challenging 
problem is that of sudden expropriation: an action that inflicts damages 
quickly before the franchisor or lender can either observe—given a feasible 
level of monitoring—or assert control. 
Sudden expropriation might occur if the debtor distributes firm value to 
shareholders in the form of dividends or share repurchases, even if it is in 
violation of a restrictive covenant, thereby leaving the firm in or on the 
verge of insolvency. Although notice is often given in advance of such 
actions, the lender’s control rights are ineffective unless the lender can 
accelerate and collect before the distribution. In contrast, firms typically do 
not give notice of borrowing from individual entities, so creditors would 
have even less timely information before their claims are diluted by the new 
debt. However, as long as the lender reacts before the borrowed value is 
dissipated, a covenant prohibiting new debt may be effective.  
Professor Rock and Professors Adler and Kahan use the leveraged buy-
out (LBO) as an example of shareholder opportunism and describe the 
protection offered by fraudulent transfer laws.31 However, because an LBO 
typically entails considerable lead time and notice, debt covenants that 
specify distinctive features of LBOs would trigger a timely shift of control 
to the lender. Bankruptcy courts apply fraudulent transfer laws—under 
which a fraudulent transfer is a transfer for less than reasonably equivalent 
value while the debtor is insolvent—to undo LBOs that render firms 
insolvent.32 Indeed, as Professors Adler and Kahan suggest, one might 
 
30 See generally Triantis & Daniels, supra note 20. 
31 Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1792-93; Rock, supra note 1, at 1939-44. 
32 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2006).  
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imagine a set of possible variations in fraudulent transfer standards (such as 
the requirements of insolvency and the absence of reasonably equivalent 
value) that could be tailored to each debtor’s circumstances.33 The parties 
might also tailor the remedies to allow them to enjoin a transaction that 
violates the contractual standard. It is noteworthy that, in Professor Rock’s 
LBO example, the bondholders lacked any such covenant, and the puzzle is 
therefore why it was omitted. Part III addresses this question. 
Where there is sudden expropriation, the lender does not have the 
opportunity to act before value is taken and the debtor becomes insolvent. 
A common legal technique for dealing with similar situations in which a 
defendant has disappeared or is judgment-proof is to place the loss on an 
available party who was in the best position to prevent the loss. Consider, 
for example, a rogue who sells a good in which he has no title to an inno-
cent party. If the rogue were not judgment-proof, the buyer could collect 
damages for breach of the warranty of title, and the goods could be returned 
to the owner. If the rogue were judgment-proof, however, the loss must be 
borne by one of the innocent parties: in this case, either the owner or the 
buyer. The law generally requires the buyer to return the good in order to 
give each buyer the incentive to check the seller’s title, particularly for big-
ticket items. One exception is when the buyer purchases a good from a 
merchant who sells that good in the ordinary course of business. To encour-
age owners to be careful as to whom they deliver possession and to facilitate 
merchant sales, the law gives title of the good to the buyer, rather than to 
the owner who entrusted possession of the good to a merchant of such 
goods.34 For similar policy reasons, federal environmental and securities 
laws impose third-party liability for some harms on persons other than the 
corporate defendant who were in a position to prevent them. 
LBOs that render firms insolvent transfer wealth from creditors to 
shareholders, and those payments to shareholders are difficult to recover. In 
cases where managers execute an LBO on behalf of rogue shareholders, 
Professor Rock and Professors Adler and Kahan suggest transferring the 
loss to third parties (unless they have acted in good faith) in order to 
discourage them from participating in an LBO by an undercapitalized 
entity. Professor Rock suggests that directors and officers who knowingly 
 
33 See Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1794-1804 (suggesting that creditors could create con-
tract rights with results mimicking those of bankruptcy law). 
34 U.C.C. § 2-403 (2012). 
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approve such a transaction should be personally liable if their firm violates 
fraudulent transfer laws.35 
In their discussion, Professors Adler and Kahan see merit in imposing 
liability on the lenders who enable constructively fraudulent LBOs or on 
the shareholders who benefit from them. They propose that the allocation of 
loss be determined contractually at the time of the earlier debt financing.36 
Indeed, the authors envisage that the debtor would have the ability to 
impose liability on a variety of third parties who would control or benefit 
from a range of debtor misbehavior. Such third parties include future 
creditors, corporate affiliates, shareholders, or directors. The misbehaviors 
are those actions identified as the product of the shareholder–creditor 
conflict, particularly the distribution of firm value to shareholders or 
excessive future borrowing.37  
As Professors Adler and Kahan recognize, the obstacle facing their sugges-
tion is that contractual obligations are binding only on parties to the 
contract. The contract between the lender and debtor might include other 
parties—such as the current directors and officers, other creditors, or 
shareholders—as sureties or guarantors. However, this raises practical 
difficulties when these parties are numerous and dispersed. Moreover, 
directors, shareholders, and creditors change over time, and the new ones 
will not be bound by the previous agreement. In contrast, individual 
consent is not required to effect statutory or judicial provisions, like those 
governing fraudulent transfers, avoidable preferences, equitable subordination, 
lender liability, and veil piercing. The advantage of regulation is that it 
binds future parties that fit the class of defendants defined in the statute or 
common law. Given that Professors Adler and Kahan prefer contracting 
over regulation and wish to bind third parties, they propose changing the 
contract law governing debt contracts to allow such contracts to bind future 
 
35 See Rock, supra note 1, at 1946 (“Given the complexities of clawing back payments made to 
dispersed shareholders [as fraudulent transfers], corporate law’s strategy of providing directors 
with incentives not to make such payments in the first place makes sense.”). 
36 Under Professors Adler and Kahan’s framework, placing liability on future creditors—
whether under fraudulent transfer rules or under debt contracts—would induce them to be more 
cautious in learning about the transaction and to make sure, for example, that the debtor is not left 
undercapitalized. Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1793. In contrast, Professor Rock says that “LBO 
lenders . . . are neither the initiating parties, nor the actors with fiduciary duties to the corporation 
or the actors with direct access to the relevant information . . . . The real justification for imposing 
obligations on them, backed by the threat of losing priority . . . seems to be to recruit them to 
force the LBO sponsors and the Target firm to adopt a sound financial structure. . . . This is in 
tension with the general principle that creditors do not have duties to look out for the interests of 
other creditors." Rock, supra note 1, at 1945. 
37 Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1798. 
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third parties.38 They contemplate a range of possible remedies, including 
depriving the new creditor of its security interest, subordinating its claim 
against the debtor’s assets, or imposing liability for the payment of compen-
satory (but not punitive) damages. 
As the authors note, their proposal to allow for remedies for breach 
against third parties lies at the interface between contract and property law. 
Some scholars distinguish between contract and property by defining 
contractual rights as those enforceable only against other contracting parties 
and property rights as enforceable against all the world.39 From this per-
spective, Professors Adler and Kahan wish to import a distinctive feature of 
property into contract, and such blurring of the line between the two types 
of rights has some precedent. As described earlier, various areas of law (like 
avoidable fraudulent transfers) bind third parties in order to incentivize 
them to take precautions or to exercise influence over circumstances in 
which the primary actor might become insolvent or otherwise judgment-
proof. Even within contract law, injunctive remedies in contract law play a 
similar role in effectively binding third parties who have not consented to the 
contract.40 Consider, for example, a covenant not to compete in an employ-
ment contract. In many instances, the covenant is enforceable by injunction, 
which prevents another employer from hiring the worker. This remedy 
against a third party is valuable because of the risk that the employee is 
judgment-proof and unable to compensate her employer for breach of the 
covenant. The threat of an injunction gives the former employer the 
leverage to extract compensation from the new employer in exchange for a 
release from the covenant. In this sense, the future employer is bound by 
the initial contract to which it is not a party because the covenant restricts 
the future employer’s ability to hire the worker, irrespective of the worker’s 
solvency. 
A core legal principle requires that property interests be observable by 
third parties at relatively low cost in order for them to be enforceable. 
Commerce would be impeded if the contours of a seller’s title were opaque 
to buyers. The notice requirement is in large part attributable to enforce-
ment costs and the risk of insolvency. After all, if buyers could be fully 
compensated by their sellers for damages due to breach of warranty of title, 
they would be more willing to transact despite incomplete information. As 
 
38 Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1794-95. 
39 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 148, 157 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds., 2011).  
40 Professor Henry Smith discusses another borderline case of servitudes in real, tangible, 
and intellectual property. Id. at 167-68. 
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Professors Merrill and Smith observe, the concern with information costs 
has led to legal restrictions on the ability of owners to create new forms of 
property and, at least in some contexts, the law appropriately limits proper-
ty to a finite number of possible interests.41 For example, an owner cannot 
create and transfer a time-share property interest in a watch that is limited 
to Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.42 The property interest must be 
enforceable either on all days or on none. 
The principle of a closed number of property forms limits the contracting 
parties’ flexibility to maximize the surplus of the transaction by tailoring the 
property interest. However, as Professors Merrill and Smith argue, the 
restriction yields countervailing information cost savings.43 For example, 
each time a prospective buyer looks to buy a watch, she does not need to 
investigate whether the owner’s title is limited to only some of the days of 
the week. Nor will the buyer be called upon in court to rebut the existence 
of a prior partial interest (for example, ownership on Tuesdays, Thursdays, 
and Saturdays). The social cost of such activity depends, of course, on how 
numerous and definite the affected group of parties is.44 As a normative 
matter, the optimal number of interests is determined by weighing the 
information cost savings against the cost of foregone flexibility. Yet, as 
Professors Smith and Merrill point out, a lot of flexibility can be attained by 
combining the available property forms as building blocks.45 
 A similar concern would arise if the tailored and varied fraudulent 
transfer provision and other covenants were enforceable against third 
parties. Professors Adler and Kahan are sensitive to the concern about 
information costs and propose ways to lower investors’—particularly 
creditors’—cost of investigating firms. For example, they would restrict the 
enforceability of covenants, such as a negative pledge clause, to relatively 
sophisticated lenders who later make material investments and who would 
likely screen the debtor for other risk factors such as cash flow, credit 
 
41 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000); Smith, supra note 39, at 159. 
42 Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 27. 
43 “In rem rights are directed at a wide and indefinite audience of dutyholders and other 
affected parties, who would incur high information costs in dealing with idiosyncratic property 
rights and would have to process more types of information than in the absence of [a closed 
number of property forms].” Smith, supra note 39, at 149; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 30. 
44 Smith, supra note 39, at 154. But see, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, 
Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 373, 379-82 (2002) (finding Professor Merrill and Smith’s marginal cost analysis “uncon-
vincing”). 
45 Smith, supra note 39, at 152-53; Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 39-40.  
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record, and asset ownership.46 The authors also contemplate that third 
parties would be liable only if they had actual or constructive notice of the 
contractual provision and the remedy. They propose a central depository for 
contracts filed against the legal name of the debtor that might operate 
alongside the current registry for personal property security interests.47 
These suggestions for reducing information costs make the extension of 
quasi-property rights more feasible, especially if the records themselves can 
be standardized and digitized to dramatically lower search costs. The 
authors do not indicate that they would require registration, presumably to 
reduce the cost burden on the debtor. However, allowing for other forms of 
constructive notice would increase uncertainty and information costs on 
creditors dealing with all debtors. It could also lead to other complications, 
including undermining the elegance and simplicity of the priority system of 
Article 9 of the UCC. For example, consider a negative pledge clause that 
explicitly subordinates future creditors who violate by lending on a secured 
basis. Suppose the clause is not filed in a public registry so as to constitute 
constructive notice to all third parties. Two secured creditors, C1 and C2, 
subsequently deal with the debtor. C1 has either actual or constructive 
notice of the provision and files to perfect its security interest in order to 
enjoy priority over existing and future creditors. C2 lends on a secured basis 
without knowledge and files. The debtor (or its bankruptcy trustee) can 
subordinate C1 but not C2. However, because it files first, C1 has priority 
over C2. 
Professors Adler and Kahan argue that debtors will internalize the social 
costs of incorporating third-party remedies because creditors, shareholders, 
and directors will charge more for their capital and services to compensate 
for the costs of search and uncertainty. Debtors would therefore only adopt 
third-party liability for breach of covenants if the benefits would outweigh 
the information costs incurred by those parties. However, the core justifica-
tion for the closed number of property interests, advanced by Professors 
Merrill and Smith, stems from the external costs imposed on debtors who 
choose not to incorporate such provisions (or who impose mild remedies) 
and nevertheless bear the information costs incurred by third parties who 
deal with them. 
It is helpful, however, to look at the other side of the ledger, to the expected 
incremental benefits from the greater flexibility that debtors would have to 
 
46 Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1801-03. The materiality threshold, they suggest, would 
depend on the extensiveness of the remedy, that is, whether it subordinates or imposes damages 
liability on the third party. Id. 
47 Id. at 1801  
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impose sanctions on third parties, including liability for compensatory 
damages. The existing contract doctrine already enforces some promises— 
such as noncompete covenants—by injunction without requiring prior 
notice to affected third parties. Tortious interference with contract also 
might be invoked to impose liability on a future creditor who intentionally 
lends in violation of the covenant.48 Professors Adler and Kahan’s proposal 
would give debtors the flexibility either to relax or to opt out of this rule. 
Debtors could impose liability on parties who had constructive knowledge 
of the breached covenant but who did not intend to induce the debtor to 
breach, thereby reducing the burden of proof on the debtor or its trustee. 
Or the debtor could take the opposite tack by contractually limiting the 
sanction either completely or to the avoidance of a security interest or 
subordination of a claim. The mere possibility of third-party liability raises 
costs for all lenders who would be inclined to search or bear the risk, and 
therefore also all debtors. 
Professors Adler and Kahan’s proposal should be assessed on the basis of 
the incremental improvement it would yield over existing mechanisms in 
both contract and property law. Security interests are very significant in this 
respect. A security interest gives the secured creditor priority in the collateral 
as well as rights to repossess the collateral on default without invoking the 
judicial process. There is a sophisticated regime in place to give notice of 
security interests.49 Security interests have many possible roles in corporate 
finance and have been shown to restrict overinvestment, cure underinvest-
ment, and constrain distributions to shareholders and LBOs.50 
Professors Adler and Kahan, however, say that their goal is “to broaden 
the scope of creditor protection that secured credit now provides in a 
needlessly narrow fashion.”51 They may understate the potency of security 
interests. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, security interests restrict 
 
 
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1977); see Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, 
at 1810-12. 
49 It should be noted that the registration regime for security interests still imposes signifi-
cant search responsibility on the third party. The registration against the debtor’s name simply 
discloses that the debtor may have granted a security interest in some or all of the identified assets. 
U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 (2000) (“The notice itself indicates merely that a person may have a 
security interest in the collateral indicated. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be 
necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.”). The notice requirement reflects a balancing of 
burdens on secured creditors, on the one hand, and creditors and other third parties who 
contemplate dealing with the debtor, on the other. 
50 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 
904 (1986) (describing how security interests ameliorate agency conflicts in debt financing). 
51 Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, at 1798. 
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the ability of debtors to engage in the various types of misbehavior that fall 
under the agency costs of debt.52 In order to pay out firm value to share-
holders, for example, debtors must have liquid assets. Security interests 
constrain the ability to convert nonliquid assets to liquid assets through 
sales or leases. As another example, the debtor will have difficulty borrowing 
large amounts if its assets have been pledged as collateral, especially to 
finance an LBO. 53 
These restrictions are somewhat rigid in that they allow the secured par-
ty to block even value-increasing activity. It is more difficult for a debtor to 
finance a profitable opportunity if it lacks liquidity and substantially all its 
assets are covered by security interests. However, there are other valuable 
exceptions that ameliorate this rigidity, such as setting up a separate entity, 
borrowing with purchase money security interests, or debtor-in-possession 
financing in bankruptcy.54 
The wisdom behind security interests is that, despite their simplicity, 
they offer flexibility along two dimensions: the collateral assets covered 
(current and after-acquired) and the obligations secured (current and future 
indebtedness). Professors Adler and Kahan’s concern is that the security 
interest operates only to alter priority of claims while their proposal would 
permit more significant sanction in the form of damages liability. 55 It is not 
clear, however, why such liability would be necessary to deter a future 
creditor, for instance, from financing an undesirable LBO. After all, the 
LBO lender would lose some or all of the capital it contributes to the 
insolvent entity because it would be subordinated to the earlier secured 
interest.  
In sum, Professors Adler and Kahan argue persuasively that creditors 
would value enforcement rights against subsequent parties who enable 
 
52  See George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 35 (2000); George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor 
Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155 (1994).  
53 Indeed, much of the value in Professors Adler and Kahan’s proposal to enforce negative 
pledge clauses against future creditors can be attained by granting the early creditor a security 
interest. See Barry E. Adler, Accelerated Resolution of Financial Distress, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1169, 1201 
(1998) (advocating for the use of contingent security interests for early creditors). 
54 See Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, supra note 52; Tri-
antis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, supra note 52. 
55 “[O]ur proposal would allow a breach victim to collect directly against a third party associ-
ated with a breach, including one who is not a creditor, while a security interest in a debtor’s assets 
operates only to alter the priority of claims against the debtor. The value of priority enhancement 
for a covenant breach is limited to the value of the debtor’s assets . . . . [B]ecause a reduction in a 
claim’s priority does not eliminate the claim, a potential third-party creditor may have a relatively 
low incentive to avoid participation in the debtor’s covenant breach.” Adler & Kahan, supra note 2, 
at 1813. 
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violations of covenants. Before legal rules are altered to allow such rights, 
however, it is worth considering whether the existing technology of contract 
rights and property interests, particularly security interests, creates suffi-
cient flexibility and potency in addressing agency conflicts. The incremental 
improvements from additional quasiproperty rights may not be worth the 
added social costs of information imposed even on the limited group of 
debtholders they prescribe. 
III. COVENANT-LITE DEBT 
A distinct puzzle that Professor Rock alludes to in passing is that debt 
contracts are sometimes designed inside the frontier of available contracting 
technology. In particular, he notes the ebb and flow of “covenant-lite” bond 
indentures over the past several decades. Indeed, in the two principal case 
studies of creditor exploitation that he presents, the bondholders could have 
protected themselves by incorporating in the indenture fairly common 
covenants that restrict change-of-control and corporate-restructuring 
transactions.56 To justify the broader mandatory legal standards that 
Professor Rock proposes on the basis of these gaps, we first need to investi-
gate the explanation for these omissions. 
Empirical observations of variations in covenant patterns raise two sets 
of puzzles. First, bond indentures tend to have less intense and less exten-
sive covenants than the contracts of institutional lenders, particularly 
banks.57 Some commentators suggest that this is because it is easier for the 
borrower to renegotiate violated covenants with a bank than with dispersed 
bondholders. Therefore, covenant default in bond indentures might lead to 
the collapse of the firm. However, indenture trustees are lax in enforcing 
nonpayment covenants, so renegotiation is not essential. A better explana-
tion stems from the observation that banks are better positioned to monitor 
and exert positive influence over firm governance. They are given broad 
powers to exercise this influence by broad covenants. Indeed, in many cases, 
banks have the right to call loans at any time either because the contract 
provides that payment is due on demand or because the covenants are so 
tight as to be violated even at the time of the agreement. Banks use this 
threat to exert control over the management of the borrower. As noted 
earlier, the governance activity of a bank generally benefits bondholders, 
 
56 In the case of the hypothetical LBO, Professor Rock states that “change-in-control covenants 
would have protected them, but during some periods of the business cycle, bonds are issued with 
minimal protection.” Rock, supra note 1, at 1940. 
57 See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 20. 
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and a number of protections in debtor–creditor law prevent banks from 
using their control to improve their position relative to other creditors.58 As 
a result, the incremental value to bondholders of stronger covenant protec-
tion in their indentures is limited, and the bondholders are better off 
relying on the bank’s governance activity.59 
Second, covenants in bond indentures appear to ebb and flow with cycles 
in capital markets. In a borrower’s market flush with investors, for instance, 
covenant-lite instruments and unsecured debt are more likely to appear. 
Industry observers attribute this phenomenon to the fact that borrowers 
have greater bargaining power in such markets. In theory, however, changes 
in market conditions—as in bargaining power—seem more likely at first 
blush to affect the price of capital and less likely to affect nonprice terms 
such as covenants or collateral. Put simply, if a protective covenant or 
security interest is efficient in reducing agency costs when capital is scarce, 
it ought to be efficient when capital is abundant. The parties should maximize 
the size of their contracting surplus by minimizing agency costs and then 
use the interest rate to divide the resulting surplus. 
In recent work, Professor Albert Choi and I have explored the theoreti-
cal explanation for why the ebb and flow of covenants and security interests 
might correlate with supply and demand.60 One set of explanations relates 
to the effect of price changes on the severity of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. All else equal, an exogenous increase in the interest rate due, for 
example, to shrinking supply of capital, tends to lower the quality of the 
pool of prospective borrowers because the increase in the expected interest 
payments is lower to high-risk borrowers that are more likely to fail. An 
increase in the interest rate also increases the incentive for opportunistic 
behavior because the shareholders have less of an interest in the value of the 
firm (since a greater share will go to the lender). Therefore, the optimal 
covenant may be tighter and more expansive in times of limited capital 
supply. The risk of opportunism, in contrast, is lower when capital is cheap; 
at the margin, it is therefore more efficient and rational for the parties to 
loosen covenants and security interests ex ante to avoid the risks of overinclu-
sive covenants and the attendant costs of litigation. Imposing a stricter 
 
58 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
59 See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 20, at 1090 (explaining that the combination of extensive 
bank covenants and light bond covenants solve the dangers that either both sets of creditors will 
freeride or duplicate monitoring activity, as can security interests); see also Rajan & Winton, supra 
note 23; Rauh & Sufi, supra note 23. 
60 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1665 (2012); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design: 
Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51 (2013). 
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standard by mandatory provision of law would undermine this efficiency 
calculus and increase the cost of capital. 
The foregoing hypotheses as to why (a) covenants are lighter in bond 
indentures than bank loans and (b) covenant-lite indentures and unsecured 
loans are more likely to appear under conditions of apparently excess supply 
of capital are far from dispositive. I describe them here selectively to 
illustrate the possibility that the weaknesses of covenant protection may be 
efficient, rather than as evidence of contracting failure. This may give 
further pause before adjusting legal rules to address the apparent gap in 
covenant protection. 
CONCLUSION 
We have not reached a steady state in the technology of contract design, 
and we ought to encourage steps to promote valuable contract innovation. 
This objective raises two fundamental questions: First, are there legal 
obstacles to innovation? Second, do contracting parties (and their lawyers) 
have the appropriate incentives to innovate and to incorporate innovations 
in their contracts? These essential questions are receiving increased attention 
in legal scholarship, and the Articles in this issue by Professor Rock and 
Professors Adler and Kahan contribute to the research agenda addressing 
these questions in the context of debt financing. Their respective proposals 
for law reform are provocative and worthy of further investigation. However, 
for reasons outlined in this Response, I have doubts in each case that the 
incremental value of the prescribed change outweighs the respective costs. 
